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Abstract 
In this paper I examine some key texts in philosopher Luce Irigaray’s oeuvre that I 
name her aesthetic of sexual difference. Her aesthetic emerges both from critical 
engagements with women artists and with theories of subjectivity formation and 
cultural formation. I argue that for Irigaray, art- making has an essential role in the 
thinking and practice of sexual difference. I also argue that because Irigaray 
reconfigures the terms on which aesthetics traditionally relies, that her aesthetic is 
methodologically indicative, rather than substantively prescriptive, of how sexual 
difference and sexuate culture might be represented.   
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Resumen 
En este artículo examino algunos textos clave en la obra de la filósofa Luce Irigaray, 
que he denominado como su estética de la diferencia sexual. Su estética surge tanto 
de compromisos críticos con las artistas y con las teorías de la formación de la 
subjetividad y la formación cultural. Sostengo que para Irigaray, la creación artística 
tiene un papel esencial en el pensamiento y la práctica de la diferencia sexual. 
También sostengo que debido a que Irigaray reconfigura los términos en los que la 
estética tradicional se basa, su estética es metodológicamente indicativa, más que 
sustantivamente prescriptiva, de cómo podrían ser representadas diferencia sexual y 
cultura sexuada. 
Palabras clave: Irigaray, diferencia sexual, arte, pintura, sensación
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Is not art a means of creating reality and not only of 
reproducing it? 
Art is a daily task for each one of us, and sexuate 
belonging is the most crucial dimension that art has 
to work out. 
We need art to enter into relationships, especially 
sexuate relationships. More generally, we need art 
to cultivate our sensorial perceptions and give to us 
a dynamic global unity, thanks to a creative 
imagination. 
(Irigaray, 2004c, p. 97-99) 
 
‘Transforming our needs into desire requires the 
mediation of art: in our gestures, in our words, in all 
our ways of relating to ourselves, to the other(s), to 
the world.’  
(Irigaray, 2013, p. 22) 
 
n ‘A Natal Lacuna,’ Luce Irigaray condemns German surrealist writer 
and visual artist Unica Zürn’s (1916-1970) work as evidence of her 
‘failure to be born’ as both artist and woman (1994, p. 13). For 
Irigaray, Zürn’s paintings and drawings express a negative relation to herself 
and the world through images that reflect the prescribed position for women 
under patriarchy: as formless ‘other’ to man. In addition to the rarity in her 
oeuvre of commenting on a particular artist’s work, the essay is significant 
for being one of the first places where Irigaray articulates her aesthetic. She 
says: ‘These enquiries [into Zürn’s work] are not a judgement on any one 
artist or group of artists, nor even on an epoch, but represent a question 
about art’ (1994, p. 12).  
 The essay provoked a rejoinder from its translator, feminist scholar 
Margaret Whitford, who describes Irigaray’s early and inspiring relation 
with feminist artists as a source of ‘creative misunderstanding’ in the light of 
the Zürn piece (1994, p. 15-17). Whitford claims Irigaray makes a number of 
remarks about Zürn’s art that can be extrapolated to define her aesthetic as 
prescriptively conservative: art is a necessary means toward an end, rather 
I 
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than an end in itself; the artistic product is more important than the artistic 
process; within the arts there is a hierarchy: images are more important than 
words; among the possibilities of image-making, artists should aspire to the 
figurative rather than the abstract, and express forms that show ‘beauty’ 
(‘repose,’ ‘unity,’ ‘harmony’) rather than ‘ugliness’ (‘void,’ ‘chaos,’ 
‘dereliction,’ ‘fragmentation’) (Whitford, 1994, p. 13-15). Whitford says 
readers fail to notice Irigaray’s stress on the death drive in her philosophy, 
which views these drives as forces in both their destructiveness and their 
creativity, albeit organised by cultural structures rather than natural instincts 
and therefore potentially available to transformation (1994, p. 16). Men 
rather than women have the symbolic resources for sublimating the 
dangerous nature of the death drive, whereas women are lacking these 
symbolic resources. Indeed, Irigaray says women function as the means for 
men’s sublimation, and thus his creativity occurs at her expense. Zürn’s 
psychic pain, which in moments of reprieve provided material for her art and 
writing, also led to her eventual suicide. According to Whitford, Irigaray’s 
analysis of Zürn’s art and her autobiographical account of her relation with 
her artist partner, Hans Bellmer, expresses in microcosm her theories of 
woman’s deadly relation to patriarchy. 
 In a further rejoinder, feminist art critic Hilary Robinson takes both 
Irigaray and Whitford to task for their failure to attend to the specificities of 
Zürn as an artist working in inks and oils, and their privileging of a literary 
model of creativity in reading her visual work (1994, p. 20). Robinson 
claims that Whitford has a misplaced expectation of Irigaray as a critic, and 
that Irigaray’s writing is of ‘rich, productive and direct benefit to feminist 
artists’ (1994, p. 20). I agree with Robinson’s conclusion, but many 
questions still hover over this exchange of views. How should readers of 
Irigaray’s radical philosophy of sexual difference respond to her comments 
on art? Should we agree with Whitford’s assessment that Irigaray’s criteria 
for art are necessarily conservative when placed within her politically radical 
philosophy? Do Irigaray’s early views on art (‘A Natal Lacuna’ was 
originally published in 1985) continue in her later writings on art and 
painting? How might women art-makers negotiate Irigaray’s writings 
(including those on art) and their own particular medium of creative 
expression? Given that art and politics have always had an impossible 
relationship, why should Irigaray’s writings escape that fate? In sum: to what 
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extent is this now twenty-year old debate in the Women’s Art Magazine 
simply a curious artefact of an early – and now surpassed? – Anglophone 
reception in Irigaray studies? Or does it encapsulate the issues of a 
continuing theme given Irigaray’s many references to art, artistry and artistic 
processes in her philosophy up to the present?  
 This essay examines Irigaray’s writings on art and particularly her 
remarks on the relation of painting to sexual difference. I claim that 
Irigaray’s reference to ‘beauty’ is a transformed aesthetic criterion 
describing a reconnection between the natural and cultural dimensions of 
sexual difference. Her writings on art indicate both a means and an 
expression of an inventive encounter between the two sexes that have yet to 
exist, rather than a perspective on art (and its prized goal of beauty) where 
art is understood as nature’s opposite and its very negation. Irigaray has no 
theoretical or practical interest in expanding the discourse of aesthetics or of 
critically interpreting the works of women artists within art history’s 
disciplinary framework. She is not interested in the work of art as an object 
of pleasure, or as a value according to an aesthetic style, nor in the artistic 
subject’s will to create. It is that very subject/object division that aesthetics 
has traditionally relied upon and her philosophy aims to overcome.  
 In the several, and sometimes cryptic, remarks Irigaray makes about 
colour and its necessary (although by no means exclusive) relation to 
painting, I locate Irigaray’s aesthetic of sexual difference. It is an aesthetic 
that emerges from and also escapes the meeting with phenomenological and 
psychoanalytic frameworks, each of which has investments in theorizing a 
monosexual model of subjectivity through art and painting. In Irigaray’s 
philosophy, ‘beauty’ names the (im) possibility for thinking nature’s and 
culture’s reconnection in the self-defined becoming of woman, thereby 
transforming the understanding of both nature and culture. I also argue that 
Irigaray’s references to painting have less to do with critiques of 
representations of women in art as rather her turning toward the painter’s 
task to think through the materiality of their medium, which is analogous to 
philosophy’s problem in thinking sexual difference. For Irigaray, sexual 
difference is not only the organising concept in her philosophy, it is also the 
philosophical problem of our era par excellence (1993b, p. 5). Before I 
address the status of art and painting in her writing, I turn to her concept of 
sexual difference.  
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Sexual difference, sexuate culture 
 
Irigaray explicitly rejects the label ‘feminist’ to describe her theoretical aims, 
preferring women’s, and more so, humanity’s liberation (See Irigaray, 
2002a, p. 67). Central to her idea of liberation is the concept of sexual 
difference, an ontological category constitutively philosophical, political and 
ethical (Grosz, 2012, p. 70). Conventional accounts explaining the 
differences between the sexes do so according to one of three typical 
models: where women and the feminine are either opposite, complementary 
or equal to men and the masculine. By contrast, sexual difference as Irigaray 
accounts for it is premised on a notion of difference where the terms 
woman/man; women/men; feminine/masculine do not pre-exist their 
difference and do not invoke a hierarchy between the terms. Irigaray says 
‘who or what the other is, I never know. But the other who is forever 
unknowable is the one who differs from me sexually’ (1993b, p. 13). ‘She’ is 
different to ‘he’ in a mode that is of another order to the difference ‘he’ is 
from ‘she:’ the difference is non-reciprocal as well as non-hierarchical. It is a 
model of difference based on two sexes that are irreducible to each other. 
 Irigaray uses the word ‘sexuate’ to describe a positively defined feminine 
identity that does not currently exist within patriarchy and phallocentrism. It 
refers to the bodily, psychical and cultural dimensions of feminine (and 
implicitly, masculine) being that for woman is reconceived from her 
negative and sexually neutral status within phallocentrism to a positive, 
sexually different status. ‘Sexuate’ refers not simply to anatomical or genital 
differences between men and women (although it does include these and 
what they enable) as if this difference were some kind of essence to sexual 
identity or a grounding principle of sexual being. Rather, ‘sexuate’ identity 
incorporates a transfigured conception of being’s identity that comprises 
dimensions that are morphological (bodily in the widest sense of a living 
form), perceptual (in terms of the sensate perspective a sexed being has of 
self, others and the world) and associative qualities (the kinds of relations 
that are possible for sexually different beings) (Grosz, 2012, p. 70). These 
dimensions of being as relational, bodily and perspectival override the 
possibility of reducing Irigaray’s account of sexual difference as biologically 
essentialist or heterosexist. In Irigaray’s more recent writings, she speaks of 
the productive encounter between sexuate beings involving the creation of a 
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third being, which cannot be reduced to the production of a child, nor a 
privileging of the heterosexual couple: ‘the real exists as at least three: a real 
corresponding to the masculine subject, a real corresponding to the feminine 
subject, and a real corresponding to their relation. These three reals thus each 
correspond to a world, but these three worlds are in interaction’ (2002b, p. 
111). Some feminists of difference have read Irigaray’s work subsequent to 
her early and predominantly critical interventions as regressively 
heterosexist (Butler & Cornell, 1998). However, Irigaray is explicit in not 
reducing the couple to a familial unit of reproduction: ‘Maternity – giving 
birth to a child – should remain an extra ... surplus to any morphology’ 
(1994, p. 13). The tantalising nature of the third being would be an inventive 
becoming of opening and closing the limits within, and mediating the 
encounter between, two sexuate beings who have yet to exist culturally. 
 Sexual difference is real, but it is not reality. It is a difference that does 
not accord with any existent identity or term. The ontological dynamic of 
being’s identity as a mode of becoming that Irigaray’s concept necessitates is 
not permissible under the Aristotelian logic of ontology that needs being to 
be either A or not-A. Within this logic, a being is defined according to a 
grouping of dominant characteristics comprising its identity/term as a 
universal category (A), or according to the absence of those (other being’s) 
characteristics in order for this being to belong to a universal identity foreign 
to its singularity (not-A). For Irigaray, sexuate being is a mode of becoming 
other than how feminine identity is defined according to this dominant logic, 
by becoming in different moments of encounter with self and other through 
the various dimensions of woman’s (and implicitly, man’s) singularly 
sexuate being. Irigarayan sexuate difference and the culture of worlds that it 
would make possible, is a radically transformed understanding of 
Aristotelian ontology.  
 Irigaray claims that in order for her radical ontology to be thought, the 
coordinates regulating the real of what is (i.e. regulating reality) – those of 
spatiality and temporality – need to be reconfigured along with the relation 
of form to matter (1993b, p. 7). A sexuate culture requires a change in our 
understanding of perception and of the inhabiting of place so that femininity 
is not figured as space, and masculinity figured as time as they are under 
patriarchy and phallocentrism (1993b, p 7; see also Olkowski, 2000). 
Woman must not be figured as space for man to achieve his accession to 
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subjectivity and thus to History; woman must not be outside her internal and 
external relation to time and thus figured as what History cannot admit as 
woman (Irigaray, 2002b, p. 121-122).  Woman needs a place proper to 
herself by having a limit or point of return within herself, and in not being 
the place of limit for man as she is within patriarchy. To achieve this 
rethinking of the ‘whole economy of space-time,’ and the relation of matter 
to form, Irigaray must look to the resources both within and outside 
philosophy for the reconfiguration of sexed being to take place (1993b, p. 
11). Irigaray’s philosophy of sexual difference is (im) possible rather than 
utopian in the sense that it is an ontologically constituted ethics premised on 
a real that exists, but which currently has no cultural expression. Irigaray 
seeks methods, techniques and practices, along with concepts, with which to 
think that expression. How art participates in the discovery and expression of 
sexuate difference is what remains to be considered in this paper. How, for 
example, does the visual medium of painting enable an approach, a 
technique, a method that gives expression to what not only does not exist in 
reality, but must also of necessity remain ‘ forever unknowable’? What do 
modernist painters’ preoccupation with vision and perception offer to 
Irigaray’s philosophy? How does the material of colour, its handling and 
applications unique to each painter, participate in making visible the 
invisible sensations that must become perceptible in the encounter that is yet 
to happen, and of which Irigaray describes as a ‘field of forces’ the two 
sexes generate (2002b, p. 108).  
 Before turning to these questions, we need to consider the necessity of 
transforming the relation of form to matter to see its relevancy to the task of 
painting sexuate difference. Irigaray has analysed the traditional relation in 
Western thought of matter to form and its sexual indifference to woman 
through her critique of the place of fluids within theories of solids. The 
morpho-logic of phallocentrism requires that what is counted as real has to 
conform to that logic which reflects the morphological qualities of the 
masculine sex (‘production, property, order, form, unity, visibility, erection’) 
(1985b, p. 77). Fluids are analogous to woman’s subjectivity within this 
patriarchal logic: woman, like fluids, cannot be counted as real or having a 
reality of her own that can be formalised on her own terms because the real 
of her being, like that of fluids, is of another order of logic to that of 
phallocentrism and its discourses of symbolisation. Irigaray reminds us that 
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ontology presumes (a) form that gives a shape, dimension(s) and substance 
to matter, and therefore presumes a logic of relation between the 
matter/material of what is (contained) within its form. The analogy between 
the resistance to formalisation of fluidity with woman’s being is that the 
universal, abstracted logic unifying reality which underpins phallocentrism 
refuses the ‘indefinite and the in-finite form [that] is never complete’ in her 
being (1985a, p. 229). Fluidity, like solids, names physical reality and 
includes internal frictions, pressures, and movements ‘continuous, 
compressible, dilatable, viscous, conductible, diffusible ... unending, potent 
and impotent owing to its resistance to the countable’ (1985c, p. 111). Fluids 
participate within, across, and through the walls of solids; they are not 
contained by the logic that erects the ‘solid/fluid’ hierarchical pairing, and 
undermine that opposition in fluids’ refusal to be in one or other place, 
conforming to one or other form. As fluids are to theories of mechanics, so 
too is woman’s being to symbolisation within the phallocentric morpho-
logic: woman’s form is Not One.  Woman does not belong to a form that 
would be geometrically placed in space and mathematically countable like 
the solid object in space.  
 Irigaray seeks forms that do not conform to the logic of mathematization, 
of quantification. In ways that are analogous to fluids and fluidity, colour 
participates in Irigaray’s philosophy because, as Ludwig Wittgenstein 
reminds us, conceptually, colour is in excess of any attempt to order its 
physical reality to a system or schema (n.d. 16e). Irigaray links her critique 
of the dominant logic of forms to colour. The patriarchal forms in which 
women have always existed are inappropriate to feminine identity, and, says 
Irigaray, we must break out of them through ‘acts of liberation’ which may 
enable us to discover colour … what’s left of life beyond forms ...... When 
all meaning is taken away from us, there remains color, colors, in particular 
those corresponding to our sex ... (1993c, p. 109). Ontologically, colour has 
multiple forms of affectivity both natural and cultural that are 
transformative: for example, in animal and plant life, forms that enable 
attractions and repulsions within and across species; in the spiritual domain 
of some cultures showing relations between inside and outside, and it has 
forms in painting that are transformations of relations between perceptual 
and pictorial space, and in rendering visible the nonvisible forces as these 
affect subjectivity’s becoming. Colour does not conform to mathematization, 
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to quantity and abstraction; it is pure quality.   It is in this context that 
Irigaray looks to art, artists and art practices to find forms and 
transformations with colour, and the thinking that painters have brought to 
their material.  
 I agree with Whitford’s warning that Irigaray’s essay on Zürn speaks of a 
prescriptive role for artists. However, it is less clear that Irigaray privileges 
figurative rather than abstract compositions, nor that art offers an end in 
itself rather than a means toward and an expression of sexuate culture.  It is 
likely that her Zürn essay gives little encouragement to practicing artists who 
seek to give figurative representation in their work to the pain and suffering 
of sexual indifference. However, if we read other of Irigaray’s references to 
art and painting back into this early essay we can also hear her articulation of 
a reconfigured ontology necessary for sexuate subjectivity and culture, and 
the artistry required of and enabled by sexuate subjectivity that is not 
confined to the practices of the professional artist. We can also hear an 
aesthetic that returns art to life and its becomings rather than to forms of 
reality and their judgements within art history.  Within a few years of the 
Zürn piece, indeed, contemporaneous with its translation into English, 
Irigaray directly addresses some of the elusive relations of colour to form, 
and of painting’s essential relation to colour that she overlooks in her 
analysis of Zürn’s art.   
 
Colour, painting, and ‘a new kind of philosophy’ 
 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty is unique among the early phenomenologists in 
aiming to get ‘to the things themselves’ in a pre-reflective manner by way of 
the perceiving body. From his philosophy of embodied perception he 
develops the concept of ‘the flesh’ that is central to his non-dualist, non-
mechanistic account of subjectivity which relies heavily on painters to 
advance and illustrate. For Irigaray, given that woman has traditionally been 
on the subordinate side of dualist thinking – mind/body; spirit/flesh; 
subject/object –the phenomenologist’s philosophy of the flesh offers great 
potential for the development of her own philosophy.  
 Merleau-Ponty pays close attention to René Descartes’s views on 
painting and its relation to colour in inaugurating his philosophy away from 
Cartesian ‘operationalism’ claiming it assumes pre-reflective contact with a 
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‘tacit cogito’ which his phenomenology targets (1962, p. 402). For 
Descartes, colour had been understood as a secondary quality to the quantity 
of res extensa, and contributes to the simulacra detrimental and redundant to 
representation. Like other inessential sensory qualities, colour has laws that 
are inaccessible to vision, and vision for Descartes is dominant among the 
senses. Although vision depends on colour to make the discriminations 
worthy of its place in the sensorium, for the early modern metaphysician, 
colour-judgements will lead to error. The percipient views colour as inhering 
in the property of the thing rather than in a relation between the percipient 
and the perceived. Descartes’s optics also views vision as passive and cannot 
account for the optical laws of colour perception: light and colour are signs 
instituted by nature to which humans do not have the code to read its laws. 
Descartes’s expressed preference for the (non-coloured) graphic arts to that 
of painting, encapsulates for the phenomenologist the monochrome and 
machine-like model of techno-rationalist thinking that dominates all 
dimensions of his metaphysics in its grasping, mastering, and objectifying 
operations of rationalist thought. As colour is ontologically essential to 
painting, for Merleau-Ponty it cannot be treated as a mere secondary quality, 
and has instead the capacity of ‘leading us somewhat closer to “the heart of 
things;”’ that is, to that pre-reflective contact with being (1993b, p. 141).  
 Merleau-Ponty focuses on how post-impressionist Paul Cézanne (in his 
writings as well as his paintings) is able to create a modulation of relations 
between things on the canvas, not by giving priority to line that would 
contain the thing within a determined form. Rather, the artist creates a form 
that is achieved through giving representation on the canvas to a mode of 
pre-reflective or ‘lived’ perception that is prior to the perception that 
consciousness organises into a perceptual unity of objects in a spatial field 
(1993a, p. 64). Cézanne’s thought and practice is applauded by Merleau-
Ponty on two counts. First, in representing on the canvas a way of seeing the 
world so that the contour or form of the thing is rendered as it emerges to our 
vision. As Merleau-Ponty says: ‘Cézanne follows the swelling of the object 
... one’s glance captures a shape that emerges from among them all, just as it 
does in perception’ (1993a, p. 65). Cézanne’s canvas depicts the practically 
imperceptible movement of the various phenomenological dimensions of 
lived perception. It is the perceptual experience as ‘lived’ in its immediacy 
with and immersion in the world that intertwines seer with seen. Of his art, 
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Merleau-Ponty says: ‘in reality we see a form which oscillates around the 
ellipse without being an ellipse’ (1993a, p. 64). The pictorial effect is not a 
thing presented as a single outline sacrificing the thing’s depth, but rather a 
thing that is presented as ‘an inexhaustible reality full of reserves’ (1993a, p. 
65). Second, Merleau-Ponty admires Cézanne for perfecting a method for 
achieving that movement of pre-reflective perceptual vision through the 
modulation of colours and their relations on the canvas. The priority 
Cézanne gives to colour (over line) results in colour blurring with line 
making the two painterly resources dissolve in order to achieve a spatial 
structure that ‘vibrates’ in the thing’s representation on the canvas. In that 
‘vibration,’ says Merleau-Ponty, ‘we see the depth, the smoothness, the 
softness, the hardness of objects ... the presence ... which for us is the 
definition of the real’ (1993a, p. 65). The painter’s thought and practice 
achieves a method for pictorial space that has its parallel in what Merleau-
Ponty is seeking phenomenologically: a tactile sense of vision; a mode of 
vision that is chiasmically rather than dualistically understood as the 
embodied relation of a self to the world.  
 In Merleau-Ponty’s idea of ‘the flesh,’ he conceives a more primordial 
formulation of embodied perception understood as the condition of both 
seeing and being seen, and of touching and being touched (1968, p. 147). 
Sight and touch have a fundamental and necessary interaction for perception, 
and they are common to, and the condition of, both the subject and the object 
in being a single ‘thing’ folded back on itself (1968, p.147). Again, the 
ontology of colour is crucial to the phenomenologist’s project to undermine 
dualist structures of thought. To use Merleau-Ponty’s example: the Red is 
seen and felt as a ‘certain differentiation, an ephemeral modulation of this 
world – less a colour or a thing, therefore, than the difference between things 
and colours, a momentary chrystallisation of coloured being or visibility’ 
(1968, p. 132). The red separates from, to continue Merleau-Ponty’s 
example, the dress, to connect with other reds that neighbour it, and form a 
constellation or field of reds that gives, in another moment of sensation, the 
dress in its form as thing-like and ultimately as object. His concept of the 
flesh is an element of being with the capacity to fold in on itself, to face 
inward toward the self, as well as outward toward other things and beings, 
and express the sensation of being as it is lived. His example of the double 
sensation of one hand touching and being touched by the other in a single 
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fold of two hands illustrates this inward and outward interface of the 
modulations connecting and reversing subject and object, whereby a body 
can be both and at once subject and object within the same field of visibility 
(1968, p. 134). The flesh expresses the shimmering or quivering of the visual 
sense felt on the eye as the difference that connects and disconnects colour to 
and from the thing. More so than any other element in his account of the 
flesh, colour has an ontological status for Merleau-Ponty of being the 
‘exemplar sensible’ in that it both gives itself as a being, and is the condition 
of Being (1968, p. 135).  
 Irigaray says Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy ‘almost mistakes itself for a 
phenomenology of painting or of the art of painting’ (1993b, p. 175). In spite 
of his philosophy’s advance beyond dualist, mechanistic subjectivity, 
Irigaray’s several engagements with his philosophy demonstrate how his 
phenomenology still retains the domination of vision within the sensorium 
through a reliance on maternal and feminine metaphors of experience, but 
does so while ignoring the real of women’s bodies. Woman’s maternal and 
feminine elements of her being, complicate his phenomenology of the flesh, 
which ultimately maintains a monosexual conception of embodiment and of 
the flesh’s relation to the world (1993b, p. 177). I take Irigaray’s criticisms 
of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of ‘the flesh’ and the visible/invisible dynamic 
in turn.  
 Irigaray begins her critique of Merleau-Ponty in her chapter, ‘The 
Invisible of the Flesh: A Reading of Merleau-Ponty’s The Visible and the 
Invisible, “The Intertwining—The Chiasm”’ in An Ethics of Sexual 
Difference (1993b), develops it further in ‘Flesh Colors’ in Sexes and 
Genealogies (1993a) and again in ‘To Paint the Invisible’ (2004b). Irigaray 
is critical of Merleau-Ponty’s references to feminine attributes such as 
fluidity (through metaphors such as ‘between the sea and the strand’); 
references to female desire (with the comment: ‘the telepathy of the visible 
when a woman knows her body to be desirable without even seeing those 
who look at her’); and to woman’s body (‘Pregnancy, Gestalt, phenomenon 
– represent a getting into contact with being as pure there is’ (1968, p. 245; 
206). While pregnancy is the word for Merleau-Ponty that ‘gives’ the pure 
givenness of the there is, he overlooks the particular entwinement of the 
flesh of the maternal body and its complication to his theory of visibility and 
invisibility in the relation between mother and fetus. His references to the 
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red of the woman’s dress ignores the more primordial red of her blood, let 
alone the white of her milk, or the colour of the fetus’s eyes that have a 
different relation again to the light and to the inside and outside of a field of 
sensation (Irigaray, 1993b, p.156). 
 Merleau-Ponty’s claim of reversibility of sight and touch may work for 
man, but not so readily for woman. The experience of tactility for and 
between the fetus and the mother is not a relation of reversibility that he 
proposes, and in terms of the senses’ reversibility, it is likewise not of the 
order of symmetry in that mother and fetus have a relation to their lived 
experience of spatiality vis a vis each other that is not reducible to sight 
(Irigaray, 1993b, p. 160). In the maternal relation, tactility has more of a 
relation to the sense of hearing than to vision (Irigaray, 1993b, p. 160). To 
Merleau Ponty’s hand-touching-hand allegory of the reversible positioning 
of active and passive sensation, Irigaray proposes the two lips where one is 
not dominant and grasping by one of the other, but remains in constant 
intimacy and is in woman’s body, already doubled sensation (1993b, p. 167) 
 The world that Merleau-Ponty describes as symbiotic with a sensible self, 
Irigaray describes as ‘solitary and solipsistic:’ an inward and outward 
movement of a masculine subject that forgets the prior movement of 
symbiosis of fetus and placenta (2004b, p. 394). From Irigaray’s perspective, 
Merleau-Ponty’s conception of world is a substitute for the even more 
primordial realm of the placenta, the sensible realm to which all human 
beings have a relation as the first ‘lived experience’ of co-belonging and co-
existing. The placenta is an organ that undertakes an intermediating role 
between mother and fetus by performing functions that benefit both beings 
while also being relatively autonomous of each: supplying blood and 
nutrients to the fetus and secreting hormones to the mother ceased by the 
ovaries during gestation (1993c, p. 39). Unlike the current cultural imaginary 
of the fetus as either fused with the mother or as a foreign body cannibilising 
its host, the biological reality of the placenta is a prized sensible-
transcendental term (invisible/visible in Merleau-Ponty’s) for rethinking the 
intermediation of the third being of sexuate identities.  
 In ‘To Paint the Invisible’ Irigaray spells out the role of painting and the 
painter that she had begun in her earlier essays as more explicitly a relation 
to invisibility. Drawing out the understanding of the monosexual invisibility 
in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, Irigaray refines her understanding of its role 
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for her own enterprise. Invisibility for the phenomenologist cannot be 
posited in dualist terms in expresssing the intelligible of the sensible 
understood as a mutual interaction and intertwining in and of the flesh. 
Alphonso Lingis, translator of The Visible and the Invisible, explains the 
invisible as the ‘wild Logos’ that does not constitute a set of principles or 
laws, but rather a system of levels posited in the sensible field by our body 
(1968, p. li ). The invisible offers a cognitive unity or the intelligibility by 
means of which sensible things are distributed in a field according to 
proximity or distance, and differentiated according to qualities or intensities. 
He adds: ‘like the light, these levels and dimensions [of the sensible], this 
system of lines of force, are not what we see; they are that with which, 
according to which, we see’ (Lingis, 1968, p. li). The invisible is the field 
that unfolds the visible of sensible being.  
 Citing Paul Klee, whose well known formula: the painter’s task is not to 
render the visible as rather render visible, Irigaray refines her account of 
what constitutes the invisibility of the flesh for sexual difference, and 
implicates the role of painting in its actualisation. Whereas in her chapter in 
An Ethics of Sexual Difference, Irigaray names the invisible as the maternal-
feminine, in an interview preceding her later essay, she refers to the invisible 
as ‘relations between us and the world, us and the other(s)’ (1993b, p. 173; 
2004a, p. 395). Irigaray progressively refines her understanding of the 
invisible of sexuate difference from terms that do not exist in the imaginary 
and symbolic orders to terms for expressing the ontological real of woman 
and of her series of relations that are constitutive of her being and for which 
she seeks forms that do not yet exist. The current phase of Irigaray’s writings 
comes to increasingly focus on real forces that are non-human and inorganic 
in comprising the contours of these relations to the world(s) in which we co-
belong. These worlds are of another order of relation to the single world 
Merleau-Ponty’s flesh outlines (see Irigaray 2013; 2002b; 2004b). The 
ethical dimension of her ontology of sexual difference therefore expands the 
ontology of her ethics beyond any bodily limit of ‘lived experience’ 
[Erlebnis] of phenomenological inquiry. Irigaray says: ‘the ability to be at 
the same time seeing and seen, touching and touched, does not seem to be 
specifically human’ (2004b, p. 397). The ‘specifically human’ is insufficient 
for defining relations with the world and others, or sufficient in 
characterising ‘becoming human’ (see Irigaray, 2002b, p. 117-133). In 
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‘Flesh Colors,’ Irigaray describes these non-human forces of the real on 
sexed beings in reference to the invisible forces of light waves and sound 
waves in producing the perceptual field prior to the language in which 
perceptions would be interpreted, and these forces have different affective 
modalities on the perceptual capacities of the subjects according to their sex 
(2004b, p. 397). Irigaray folds back Merleau-Ponty’s thought onto itself 
seeking not so much to preserve his conception of a flesh that materially 
provides the support for both vision and thought, but of opening ‘another 
relation between flesh, vision and thought’ (2004b, p. 390).  
 Irigaray’s relation to Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is equivocal yet she 
does not repudiate phenomenology even when questioned about its value to 
her work (Irigaray, 2008, p. 129-132). Rather, she adapts the concept of ‘the 
flesh’ to other contexts such as the clinical practice of psychoanalysis and 
destabilises both practice and theory and the relation between the two. 
Irigaray’s own relation to psychoanalysis is also well known for being highly 
equivocal, however, she has been a practicing psychoanalyst herself and 
views psychoanalysis as having the potential for transformation because it is 
the ‘scene that calls the very condition of representation into question’ 
(2002c, p. 193). Irigaray considers the ‘drama of analysis’ as theatrical in its 
incorporation of the physical props, gestures or the bodily posture(s) of its 
actors, and the verbal and non-verbal exchanges of speaker/listener: a setting 
that ‘corresponds to an optical illusion’ (2002c, p. 199; p. 201). She argues 
the classical setting of the encounter creates an artificial reality that places 
the analysand in a ‘blind’ and ‘supine’ orientation toward the analyst and 
therefore disoriented from her immediate, and particularly, visual 
perceptions.  The sensory deprivation of both actors is further described in 
terms of the disequilibrium of sound and light waves affecting the 
analysand’s perceptual capacities. Irigaray prescribes to her colleagues (the 
essay was originally delivered as a lecture to a professional conference) that 
the solution to this disequilibrium between the nonhuman speeds of light and 
sound forces and the disorientation between human actors is ‘to paint.’ Her 
point is not only to reorientate the position of the actors (side-by-side and 
vertical rather than back-to-front and vertical/horizontal) in the encounter 
and who may be same or other sex to each other.  Her aim is also to provide 
another form to the expression of those perceptual affects through a non-
linguistic medium. Irigaray claims the different speeds of light and sound 
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(waves) are the conditions of vision and hearing (that is, conditions of the 
perceptual field) between subjects, but the different speeds of this ‘physical 
matter’ of real, invisible and non-human forces puts speech/listening out of 
balance, and leads to the analysand’s inability to integrate the present in the 
past, and the past into the present and the future. Irigaray says: ‘we need to 
give back to each sense the objective and subjective speeds of its current 
perceptions and facilitate harmony between these, and the past, present, and 
future history of the subject’ (1993a, p. 156). Citing Paul Klee, she says that 
painting in the therapeutic encounter would ‘spatialize perception and make 
time simultaneous’ (1993a, p. 155). Against Freud’s (untheorised) practice 
of the ‘talking cure’ and his theory of the death drive (that women fail to 
sublimate) as the necessary prerequisite for a transition to culture, Irigaray 
overlays these Freudian insights with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology to 
radically surpass both knowledge domains. And painting as key to her 
strategy.  
 Freud examines sublimation of the death drives in a number of places in 
his writings, but it is his connection of the subject’s psychical processes to 
the founding of social organization that has relevance to Irigaray’s 
imperative that women must learn ‘the art of genital sublimation’ (1993a, p. 
165). Sublimation is a psychical process consisting of the abandonment of an 
erotic aim and taking on another that is social. Freud argues that ability to 
sublimate bodily drives and their manifestation in affects, representations 
and artistic practices is the source of human civilization and creativity (1961, 
p. 82). Without this ability, he says, we lose the basis for creating meaning 
for our own lives, and we remain unhappy or outside culture. Freud offers 
some suggestions for overcoming the arbitrariness of the opportunity to 
sublimate, such as devoting one’s life to artistic production. However, as 
these means involve either social supports and/or conditions that are not 
universally available – he cites artistic genius for example – he proposes 
other measures. He suggests sexual love and beauty, each of which is 
universally available (Freud, 1961, p. 82). Regarding beauty, he adds, there 
is no ‘obvious use or cultural necessity [for it] and yet civilization could not 
do without it’ (1961, p. 82). Connecting the means of happiness to the 
creation of culture as a mode of creativity, Freud explains the archaic origin 
of culture as the redirection of sexual drives from natural aims, in the first 
instance, from their maternal origin, and then secondarily their homosexual 
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desire, to compete among men by urinating on the threatening flames of fire. 
However, when these drives of homosexual competition were redirected to 
another aim, thereby taming yet another desire of nature, culture came into 
being for which the continued sublimation of (homo)sexual aims would 
ensure its progression. Freud claims that due to women’s anatomical 
deficiency for dousing the flames, her role was to be the guardian of the fire. 
In Freudian theory, then, woman’s genitals represent a double handicap in 
being neither beautiful nor culturally productive, merely re-productive. To 
which Irigaray replies:  
 
‘This imperative of genital sublimation [something that we women 
have either forgotten or never learned the art of] solves the 
dilemma of art for art’s sake. If art is a necessary condition for the 
establishment of a culture of affective relationships, and especially 
sexual relationships, then art is useful as a place where individual, 
bodily matter can be transmuted and sublimated. Art is not just an 
aid to a social body that has already been abstracted from the 
sexual dimension … Without art, sexuality falls into a natural 
immediacy that is bound up with reproduction and into infinite 
particles’ (1993a, p. 165).  
 
 We know from Merleau-Ponty that colour can be a mode of access to 
‘pre-discursive experience’ (Irigaray, 1993b, p. 151) and that for him 
painting (that is, rendering with colour), unlike drawing, is a mode of 
expression more appropriate to making intelligible that sensible experience 
than is the mode of spoken language. It is also an expression which produces 
in the psychoanalytic clinical encounter an artefact shared with another, that 
may be either ephemeral or enduring, but one that would contribute to 
thinking a sexuate culture in the way in which Freud speaks of artistic 
activity as a necessity of culture’s founding and perpetuation. Given that 
woman’s role in monosexual economies of culture have been caught 
between her value as a use and as an exchange – as a value of utility even 
when she is a sign of value – the production of a woman-defined culture 
through the creation of non-utilitarian production of art would seem to be a 
necessary precondition of Irigaray’s sexuate culture (see Daley, 2012).  
 Irigaray directs her complex reading of inter-subjectivity and sexual 
identity in ‘Flesh Colors’ through painting in the clinical context, and is also 
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making a larger claim for women’s creativity to the construction or 
production of a culture appropriate to her sex: ‘This is the indispensable road 
to take not only for psychoanalysis but, more generally, in every 
relationship, if we are to realize an art of the sexual that respects the colors, 
the sounds, and the forms proper to each sex’ (1993a, p. 165). 
 Irigaray is critical of Freud for his theory of sublimation, in refusing 
women the access to the creation of culture, she is also critical of Freudian 
theory that forgot its early practice as ‘talking cure’ when the analyst 
listened closely to what women were saying and how they were saying it 
(2002a, p.  208). At a certain historical point in its development as a science, 
psychoanalysis forgot to listen to women’s voices (2002a, p. 203). 
Significantly, Irigaray is not urging a return to that early kind of listening, as 
rather a different mode of encounter between analyst and analysand: a 
sexually different relation to the perceptual field; a sexually different 
orientation of bodies in the analytical field; a non-linguistic mode of 
expression that has an essential relation to colour. 
 
Rendering the invisible: relations of forces and matter 
 
We might ask of Irigaray’s aesthetic, Why painting? Why is her 
reconfigured aesthetic focused on the resources of an art form that among all 
the arts, is possibly the most inherently misogynist in its traditional figuring 
of woman as muse to the genius (male) artist or as the model of beauty to be 
represented; where the studio is a physical externalisation of the 
appropriation of place that Irigaray’s analyses repeatedly examine and 
repudiate (see Pollock, 1992; Schor, 1996)? Why painting rather than say, 
writing, sculpture, or music? First, painting has an ontological link with 
colour in a way, as we have seen via Merleau-Ponty and Descartes, other 
forms of rendering do not. Second, as Irigaray reminds us, colour belongs to 
nature as well as to culture, and her philosophy seeks methods and 
techniques for thinking the contexts of their reconnection. Third, since the 
crisis in representation that photography’s arrival created more than one and 
a half centuries ago, it is painting’s task to render visible what is otherwise 
imperceptible or invisible.  
 This is all of art’s purpose: rather than to give an opinion or make a 
judgement on the world, that is to represent the world, art’s purpose is to 
GÉNEROS –Multidisciplinary Journal of Gender Studies, 3(1) 392 
 
 
render the aggregations of sensations that our being-in-the-world effects 
(Deleuze, 2002, p. 31). All art has this task: to give expression to sensations 
that are ordinarily inhibited from our modalities of perception. In the case of 
visual perception, Cézanne understood well that his task was to paint the 
sensation, and that ‘sensation is the master of deformations’ so that when 
painting links itself to sensation, it ‘ceases to be representative and becomes 
real’ (Deleuze, 2002, p. 32; p. 40). When art forms give expression to 
sensation we know that it is neither of the subject nor of the object, but 
rather between subject and object even when the object is an apple. We 
should heed Deleuze’s understandings of the relations of painters to 
expressions of the invisible and imperceptible of forces of sensations in their 
participation in sexuaal difference. They are close to Irigaray’s aims of 
seeking to discover the expressive means of rendering the sensations of 
relations between self and other(s) and self and world(s).  
 Women need to create the artefacts that would be the symbolic resources 
to which we can look and with which we can form a feminine imaginary, the 
lack of which from patriarchy’s perspective, has been cited as preventing her 
accession to culture, and which are necessary for a sexuate culture to be 
figured. Perhaps more so, women, and not only professional artists, need to 
view art as a form of making in contexts where an enduring artefact may (or 
may not) emerge, but more importantly one where outside of a solipsistic 
(and therefore, solitary) form of relation, there might be a rendering of the 
sensation of the woman-to-woman relation as the opportunity for a double 
creation; of rendering visible what is either currently formless or 
inappropriately man’s form. Irigaray says ‘making has seldom been 
considered as a work carried out inside subjectivity’ (emphasis added, 
2002b, p. 115). By ‘inside’ here, Irigiaray is talking of women’s need to turn 
inward toward herself, to form a relation of spacing within herself from 
which she can create herself through her relation(s) with other women. I take 
this necessity of the internal movement of self-affection to be what Irigaray 
determined Unica Zürn did not achieve. What appears in that early essay of 
Irigaray’s as art criticism is Irigaray’s analysis of women under patriarchy.  
When art can be viewed as making at least as much as the made, the 
essential space-time reconfiguration of sexuate difference enables the 
rendering of what is invisible to patriarchy, and sets the scene for a sexuate 
culture to come.  
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